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The present article is concerned with organizational flexibility in transnational corporations (TNCs), 
i.e., larger firms that operate in multiple national markets. Contrasting prior research into entry 
modes (e.g. joint ventures, greenfield investments, or acquisitions), the present article examines the 
way the organization of evaluation teams can influence entry and exit decisions of business units. 
Empirical studies broadly support the claim that TNCs experiment with flexible organizational 
structures in response to increased levels of turbulence and uncertainty in international markets. 
However, these advances in the description of TNCs, and more generally in the literature on new 
organizational forms, have been largely ignored in our theories about evaluation of market 
opportunities in TNCs and multi-national corporations (MNCs). To address this gap in our 
knowledge, the present article examines the effects of flexible evaluation teams when TNCs assess 
the viability of international markets characterized by high levels of uncertainty. Remarkably, we 
show that TNCs employing flexible teams of (very) fallible evaluators can obtain profits at levels 
that asymptote optimality. Our main result supports the claim advanced in recent empirical studies. 
Structural flexibility can help TNCs employing (very) fallible evaluators achieve high levels of 
performance in conditions of turbulence and uncertainty.  
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 Evaluation of Uncertain International Markets:
The Advantage of Flexible Organization Structures
1 Introduction
The present article is concerned with organizational ﬂexibility in trans-national cor-
porations (TNCs), i.e., larger ﬁrms that operate in multiple national markets. Con-
trasting prior research on entry modes (e.g. joint ventures, greenﬁeld investments,
or acquisitions), the present article examines the way the organization of evaluation
teams can inﬂuence entry and exit decisions.
Recent empirical studies broadly support the claim that TNCs experiment with
ﬂexible organizational structures in response to increased levels of turbulence and
uncertainty in international markets. However, these advances in the description of
TNCs, and more generally in the literature on new organizational forms, have been
largely ignored in our theories about evaluation of market opportunities in TNCs
and MNCs. To address this gap in our knowledge, the present article examines the
eﬀects of ﬂexible evaluation teams when TNCs assess the viability of international
markets characterized by high levels of uncertainty.
A critical issue is the problem of entry and exit in uncertain international mar-
kets, whether by joint ventures, greenﬁeld investments, or acquisitions (Kogut &
Singh, 1988; Reuer, 2000). Costly mistakes get made. TNCs enter markets that
turn out to oﬀer losses and they stay clear of markets that would have been sources
of gains. There is a similar problem of deciding when to exit. Under uncertain
conditions, a promising market opportunity can turn sour. Sometimes, TNCs exit
markets when their continued presence would have led to gains and they fail to exit
markets even when a continued presence only leads to further losses. Costly mis-
takes get made, and increased market uncertainty can lead to both more frequent
and more severe mistakes. We examine whether ﬂexible organization structures can
somehow be designed to reduce such mistakes and thus increase rents, as claimed in
the literature on new organizational forms (Child, 1997; Heydebrand, 1989; Ilinitch,
D’Aveni, & Lewin, 1996; Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Volberda, 1996, 1998; Zahra &
O’Neill, 1998).
We relate these insights to a fairly recent eﬀort in the study of entry and exit
decisions in response to uncertainty in international markets (Delios & Henisz, 2003;
Kogut & Singh, 1988; Reuer, 2000). Delios & Henisz (2003) found changes in
investment sequences occur because ﬁrms shift from an emphasis on developing
knowledge about international markets and consumers in low-hazards markets to an
international expansion strategy in uncertain policy environments. Thus, evaluation
3of market opportunities in uncertain policy environments was a critical determinant
of entry and exit. While research into the eﬃcacy of alternative modes of entry
and exit into international markets (e.g. joint ventures, greenﬁeld investments,
or acquisitions) has a long pedigree, there has been little research into the way
evaluation of market opportunities inﬂuence entry and exit in international markets
(exceptions are Delios & Henisz, 2003; Reuer, 2000). The present article oﬀers a
framework that helps think about these issues in a systematic way.
We develop a modeling structure that allows comparison of industry entry and
exit under alternative assumptions of managerial ability and diﬀerent levels of mar-
ket turbulence. Three types of decision makers - the optimizer, the local searcher,
and the fallible evaluator - are compared in a generic entry-exit model where un-
certain conditions in an international market is modeled as ﬂuctuating short-run
proﬁts. Two extreme forms of evaluation teams - the hierarchy and the polyarchy
(a ﬂat team) - are considered. The aim of the model is to examine whether teams
of fallible evaluators can beneﬁt from being located in ﬂexible organizations, e.g.,
from shifting between hierarchical and polyarchical modes of organization.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 below reviews the literature on new
organizational forms. A broad empirical literature supports a claim that ﬂexibil-
ity outperforms rigidity under conditions of pervasive uncertainty and high turbu-
lence in international markets. Section 3 develops a modeling structure that allows
comparison of industry entry and exit under alternative assumptions of managerial
ability and diﬀerent levels of market turbulence. We also examine whether teams of
fallible evaluators can beneﬁt from being located in ﬂexible organizations. Remark-
ably, we show that TNCs employing ﬂexible teams of fallible evaluators can obtain
high levels of proﬁts even under conditions of pervasive uncertainty. Section 4 con-
siders implications and concludes the article.
2 Literature Review
The recent decade’s research on organizational forms has gained headway in con-
verging upon a few particularly important causes of the new forms that have been
observed. Reﬂecting wide agreement in the organization literature, Child & Mc-
Grath (2001) in their introduction to nine articles in a special research forum on new
organizational forms, published in the Academy of Management Journal, pointed to
increased information intensity and internationalization as the main challenges that
have resulted in the emergence of the new forms.
The mentioned challenges were usefully grouped into four broad categories: (1)
increased interdependence in interaction among organizations, (2) the possibility of
disembodiment of performance from asset ownership, (3) higher velocity character-
izing almost all aspects of organizational functioning, and (4) changes in power, in
terms of a shift from a power-base of tangible assets and inputs to power derived
from possession of knowledge and information. The widely observed new organiza-
4tional forms, it is argued, have emerged in response to these challenges. According
to Child & McGrath (2001), the objective of the new form is to delegate decision
rights to where the relevant knowledge and information reside, then to use informa-
tion technology (IT) for support.
In contract economics, this move of decision rights, closer to those with informa-
tion, has been referred to as the “organization redesign solution,” as opposed to the
traditional MIS solution according to which it is information which is moved closer
to the decision maker (Brynjolfsson & Mendelson, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1992;
Nault, 1998). Fundamental advances in IT and measurement technologies have fa-
cilitated a number of experiments with organizational forms (Nault, 1998; Zenger &
Hesterly 1997) that are often referred to by the notion of “new organizational form”
(Daft & Lewin 1993). A common characteristic of these experiments is the use of
IT in hierarchies to achieve a decentralization of decision rights (Child & McGrath,
2001; Nault, 1998). Whereas advances in IT are commonly viewed as a facilitator of
new forms, hypercompetition is seen as the primary cause of their emergence since
traditional forms are considered maladaptive when massive change, environmental
dynamism, and considerable uncertainty are the norm (Child & McGrath, 2001;
Daft & Lewin, 1993; Volberda, 1996).
Hypercompetition refers to the shift in the rules of competition observed through
the 1990s (Ilinitch, D’Aveni & Lewin, 1996; Volberda, 1996). It is argued that rapid
technological change, the shortening of product life cycles, and the increasing ag-
gressiveness of competitors have led to increasingly shorter periods of competitive
advantage, punctuated by frequent disruptions. Often, hypercompetition is associ-
ated with fundamental uncertainty as in Volberda’s (1996, 366-367) proposition that
organizational forms must be ﬂexible under hypercompetition: “In a fundamentally
unpredictable environment which may also be dynamic and complex (hypercompet-
itive), the optimal form employs a broad ﬂexibility mix dominated by structural
and strategic ﬂexibility and has a nonroutine technology, an organic structure, and
an innovative culture.” Volberda (1996) nicely sums up the argument for ﬂexibility
that has been forwarded in much of the literature on new organizational forms: “In
the new mode of hypercompetition rents do not derive from specialized routines but
from adaptive capability. The reason is that, with hypercompetition, competitive
change cannot be predicted but only responded to more or less eﬃciently, ex post.”
(Volberda, 1996, 360). The identiﬁed imperative of ﬁrm-level ﬂexibility is, in turn,
stressing the need to maintain some level of organizational consistency. Thus, it has
been emphasized that organizations must respond to the twin pressures of exploita-
tion and exploration highlighted by March (1991). That is, organizations need to
exhibit increasing ﬂexibility while maintaining consistency and reliability (Bartlett
& Ghoshal, 1998; Volberda, 1996, 1998).
A broad empirical literature supports the argument that ﬂexibility outperforms
rigidity under conditions of pervasive uncertainty.1 If we examine the observed
1 An exception is Becker & Knudsen (2004) who ﬁnd that routinization can help managers
focus on issues that can be solved, as opposed to wasting resources in the pursuit of problems that
5changes in organizational characteristics in more detail, an impressionistic picture
with marked features appears, including downsizing (Bowman, Singh, Useem &
Bhadury, 1999), a trend toward more collaborative business relationships (Cannon
& Homburg, 2001; Nault & Tyagi, 2001), network organizations (Achrol, 1997),
ﬂexibility achieved by more organic and temporary work arrangements (Bigley &
Roberts, 2001; Child, 1997; Heydebrand, 1989; Ilinitch, D’Aveni, & Lewin, 1996;
Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Zahra & O’Neill, 1998), more nimble governance structures
(Cecil, Ciccotello & Terry, 1995; Kole & Lehn, 1997), decentralization of decision
rights (Moller & Rajala, 1999), and new employment contracts characterized by less
commitment between employer and employee (Charness & Levine, 2002).
From an organizational economics viewpoint, these observations of new forms
can be summarized as shifts: (1) from hierarchical organization to internal hybrids
that operate “horizontally,” e.g. by delegating decision rights to functional teams
and project groups (Achrol, 1997; Moller & Rajala, 1999), and (2) from market
organization to external hybrids that include vertical elements, e.g. by reducing to
a minimum the core activities retained within one unit and assigning other respon-
sibilities to semi-independent units (Child & McGrath, 2001).
A third widely noted feature is the ﬂexibility of the new organizational forms that
most empirical studies emphasize as crucial. The present article is concerned with
organizational ﬂexibility in TNCs. Empirical studies broadly support the claim that
TNCs experiment with ﬂexible organizational structures in response to increased
levels of turbulence and uncertainty. However, these advances in the description of
TNCs, and more generally in the literature on new organizational forms, have not
been given much attention in our theories about evaluation of market opportunities
in TNCs and MNCs.
To address this neglect, the present study aims to direct attention to the role of
teams in TNCs evaluation of market opportunities. To help stimulate further re-
search on this important topic, we develop a modeling structure from which testable
propositions can be drawn. This eﬀort adds to prior research on entry and exit de-
cisions in TNCs and MNCs, including prior studies on the evaluation of foreign
opportunities (Cavusgil, Kiyak & Yeniyurt 2004; Schooler, 1974). By examining
ﬂexible evaluation structures, we also add to prior studies, which examined the ef-
fect of voting rules in stable evaluation structures (Birnberg, Pondy & Davis, 1970).
The present article examines the eﬀects of ﬂexible evaluation teams when TNCs
assess the viability of international markets characterized by high levels of uncer-
tainty. A critical issue is the problem of entry and exit in uncertain international
markets. Using the common analogy from statistical inference, TNCs make errors of
omission (Type I error) and errors of commission (Type II error). TNCs enter mar-
kets that oﬀer losses (commission error) and they stay clear of markets that would
have been sources of gains (omission error). Not only is there a problem of deciding
when to enter, there is also a problem of deciding when to exit. Under uncertain
are beyond solution.
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TNCs leave an international market too early, or too late. Such mistakes are costly,
and increased market uncertainty can lead to both more frequent and even more
severe mistakes. We examine whether ﬂexible organization structures can somehow
be designed to reduce such mistakes and thus increase rents.
3 The Model
We develop a modeling structure that allows comparison of industry entry (exit)
decisions under alternative assumptions of managerial ability and diﬀerent levels
of market turbulence. Three types of decision makers - the optimizer, the local
searcher, and the fallible evaluator - are compared in an entry-exit model where un-
certain conditions in an international market is modeled as a ﬂuctuating short-run
proﬁt.
Individual evaluators: optimizer, local searcher, fallible evaluator. The TNC
operates in an uncertain international market. We invoke standard assumptions
from dynamic industry entry-exit models (Miranda & Fackler, 2002). The TNC
observes the next period’s potential operating proﬁt (πt+1), earned in case the TNC
should be active (an inactive business unit earns an operating proﬁt of zero). Based
on this information, the decision maker estimates critical levels of operating proﬁt
at which an inactive business unit should enter and an active business unit should
exit. The optimizer uses a standard numerical procedure (collocation method) to
extract the optimal critical levels of operating proﬁt from the Bellman equation.
The optimizer is an unrealistic, but useful baseline against which the performance
of fallible decision makers can be assessed.
The second type of decision maker is the local searcher, known from behavioral
theories of the ﬁrm (Cyert & March, 1963; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2005; Lant &
Mezias, 1990; Levinthal & March, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The set of
alternative actions are not presumed to be laid out in their entirety ex-ante, but
must be discovered or searched (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2005). In the present context,
the local searcher enters a new market if operating proﬁt is at least equal to zero (or
some other cut-oﬀ point) and exits if the short-run proﬁt becomes negative. In this
way, such agents search for new markets that satisfy some minimum performance
criteria (e.g. potential proﬁt should be at least zero). However, another critical
facet of bounded rationality has been largely ignored in behavioral theories of the
ﬁrm and that is, how alternatives, once identiﬁed, are to be evaluated (Knudsen &
Levinthal, 2005). While the local searcher is usually portrayed as being capable of
perfect evaluation, we now introduce the fallible evaluator.
The third type of decision maker, the fallible evaluator, has imperfect discrimi-
nating ability. This type of decision maker behaves like the local searcher, but is not
capable of making sharp evaluations of short-run proﬁt for the reasons mentioned in
7the literature on new organizational forms and elsewhere (ambiguity, complex inter-
actions, limited information, limited computation power, etc.). The discriminating
ability of the fallible evaluator is modelled as a linear screening function. The slope
of the line, indicated by the variable α, can be interpreted as the discriminating
capability of the decision maker (see Figure 1). A steeper slope, or higher value
of α, implies that the probability of entry will be centered around a narrow range
of values (around zero) for short-term operating proﬁt. With higher discriminating
ability (α), a more narrow range of values of short-run operating proﬁt can lead
to entry (exit). By contrast, with lower discriminating ability (α), a wider range
of values of short-run operating proﬁt can lead to entry (exit). For a particular
value of short-run operating proﬁt, a (costly) reversal of a prior entry (exit) decision
is increasingly likely with lower discriminating ability (α). Fallible evaluators are
therefore prone to making costly mistakes.
– FIGURE 1 –
Evaluation teams. We use Christensen & Knudsen’s (2004) recent extension of
the Sah & Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988) characterization of organizational architectures
to provide a framework with which to model evaluation in teams. The intuition of
what follows is that fallible evaluators can (always) beneﬁt from being placed in
teams whereas local searchers are beyond help because they discriminate perfectly.
Ironically, imperfect discrimination of fallible agents is a source of ﬂexibility that can
be utilized by designing appropriate evaluation teams whereas perfect discrimination
of local searchers is a rigidity of that cannot be overcome.2
Local searchers are limited in their ability to search for new alternatives, but once
identiﬁed, they are capable of perfect discrimination. Within the present context,
local search therefore approaches optimality when the critical levels of operating
proﬁt becomes a single point – say, optimal entry (exit) for non-negative (negative)
operating proﬁt. This would be the case if entry and exit costs go to zero.
In contrast to local searchers, fallible agents are not capable of perfect discrim-
ination. It can be shown, however, that fallible evaluators can be placed in teams
such that their joint screening function comes arbitrarily close to perfect discrimi-
nation (Christensen & Knudsen, 2004). Then, under the assumption of (very) low
costs of entry and exit, fallible evaluators could always gain from being located in
ﬁxed organization structures.
However, we are here interested in the more realistic case of signiﬁcant exit and
entry costs. In that case, optimal points of entry and exit are wide apart (e.g.,
see Figure 1). To help fallible agents overcome the inbuilt rigidity that only allows
them to consider a single point of optimal exit and entry, we are led to consider the
possible advantage of using ﬂexible evaluation structures. In particular, we consider
2 Remarkably, almost all of our formal models broadly relating to research in the tradition of
the Behavioral Theory of the Firm promote a view of local search that is perfectly consistent with
the present characterization of local searchers (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2005).
8two extreme forms of evaluation structures. One is the hierarchy in which a proposal
to enter (or exit) a market is validated at successive higher levels in the team. Only
if the proposal is accepted at each level, will the TNC enter a new market. The
second form is a polyarchy, a ﬂat, decentralized structure in which approval by any
one actor is suﬃcient for the proposal to be approved. A ﬂexible organization of
evaluation teams is modelled by shifting between the two forms of organization.
The eﬀect of locating fallible evaluators (e.g. α = 0.10) in a hierarchical form
is shown in Figure 2. In what we term a hierarchy, the short-run proﬁt is initially
considered by a member of the decision team. If the proposal is rejected by that
decision maker, it is eliminated from further consideration and the business unit
discontinues its activities (or remains inactive). Alternatively, if the proposal is ap-
proved by that decision maker, then it is passed on to the next decision maker in the
chain of command. A proposal is acted upon only if it is positively screened by all
of the evaluators in the team. Formally, sequential decision making in a hierarchy
corresponds to joint decision making in a team (or committee) where a proposal of
entry is only accepted if each member accepts it. As can be seen from Figure 2, a
hierarchical team of ﬁve fallible decision makers would accept entry with probability
less than 0.10 if short-run operating proﬁts were 1. By contrast, each of these would
individually accept entry with probability 0.60. The hierarchy is a “sceptical” orga-
nizational form that tends to reinforce the status quo.
– FIGURE 2 –
The eﬀect of locating fallible evaluators (e.g. α = 0.10) in a ﬂat team is shown in
Figure 3. In the ﬂat team, also known as a polyarchy, a proposed alternative can be
adopted by any of the members of the evaluation team. Only if all decision makers in
succession reject an alternative is it dismissed. Formally, sequential decision making
in a polyarchy corresponds to joint decision making in a team (or committee) where
a proposal of entry is accepted if only a single member accepts it. A polyarchical
team of ﬁve fallible decision makers would accept entry with probability higher than
0.95 if the short-run operating proﬁts were 1 even though each individual would
accept entry with probability 0.60. The polyarchy is an “optimistic” organizational
form that tends to promote change.
– FIGURE 3 –
Flexible organizational forms. The aim of the model is to examine whether
teams of fallible evaluators can beneﬁt from being located in ﬂexible organizations,
e.g., from shifting between hierarchical and ﬂat, polyarchical modes of organization.3
3 This case could also be viewed as a consistent use of a hierarchical form with shifting targets
(accepting entry versus accepting exit). In joint decision making, this is equivalent to shifting from
a rule requiring that each member of an evaluation team must accept entry to a new rule, requiring
that only one member accepts continued presence, after entry.
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a local uncertain proﬁt environment. More precisely, short-run proﬁt is an exogenous
Markov process.4 The TNC observes the short-run proﬁt π of the next period and
decides whether it should enter the international market. The next period’s potential
proﬁt is the exogenous Markov process:
πt+1 = h(πt,t+1) = ¯ π + γ(πt − ¯ π) + t+1 (1)
where  are random shocks that are i.i.d. and normally distributed, N(µ,σ2), with
mean µ = 0 and variance σ2. The parameter γ is the autoregressive coeﬃcient,
which determines the rate of reversal towards the mean, ¯ π. The following analyses
set ¯ π = 0, but vary σ and γ in order to examine alternative levels of turbulence in in-
ternational markets. With lower values of γ, the random ﬂuctuations are dampened.
Higher γ leads to longer spells of positive or negative proﬁts and lower γ increases
turbulence. Higher variance, σ2, further accentuates turbulence within the broader
environmental conditions deﬁned by γ. As regards the observed increase in market
turbulence reported in many empirical studies, this corresponds to a lowering of γ
as well as an increase in σ2 (in addition, increased diﬃculty in assessing market
oppportunities suggests a lowering of α).
The state variables are the short-run proﬁt, π, and the current operational status,
o, of the TNC in the international market.5 If the TNC is currently operating in
the international market, o is one. If the TNC does not operate, o is zero. At the
beginning of each period, the TNC makes an operating decision, a, for the next
period. If the TNC operates in the next period, a is one. If the TNC does not
operate in the next period, a is zero.
That is, the TNC observes the next period’s potential proﬁt (π) and its current
operational status (o). It then takes an action (a), whether it should operate in
the next period. In consequence, the TNC earns a reward f(π,o,a) that depends
on the current state of the economic system, the current operational state of the
TNC, and the action taken. In addition, an unknown exogenous shock inﬂuences
the next period’s potential proﬁt. The state transition function is (see e.g. Miranda
& Fackler, 2002):
g(π,o,a,) = (h(π,),a) (2)
If the TNC is not operating and decides to enter the international market under
consideration, it pays a ﬁxed entry cost, KEntry. Should the TNC be operating in
an international market and then decide to exit, there is a shutdown cost of KExit.
4 In order to provide a common reference point, the speciﬁcation of the industry entry-exit
model follows closely a simple generic model provided by Miranda & Fackler (2002), ch. 8 and 9.
5 Time subscripts should be self-explanatory and are therefore omitted in the remainder of the
text in order to simplify the exposition.
10In all simulations, KEntry was set to 10 and KExit was set to 5 (the implication of
changing these values is discussed below). The reward function is:
f(π,o,a) = πa − KEntry(1 − o)a − KExit(1 − a)o (3)
Estimation of critical levels of short-run proﬁt. The optimal value of the business
unit, V (π,o), given an observed short-run proﬁt π and operational status o, is
estimated by the Bellman equation. We use numerical methods (the collocation
method) to approximate the value function V (π,o):
V (π,o) = max
a∈{0,1}
{f(π,o,a) + δEV (h(π,),a)} (4)
The functions, f(·) and h(·) are given by eq. 2 and 3, δ is the discount rate.6
Without loss of generality δ was set to 0.99 (additional analyzes show that alterna-
tive values provide qualitatively similar results). We extract, by numerical meth-
ods, the critical levels of operating proﬁt that maximize the value function (eq. 4).
These provide simple criteria for optimal entry and exit. In addition, note that the
two components of the value function eﬀectively express the well-known trade-oﬀ
between exploitation of an immediate reward (f(π,o,a)) and the exploration asso-
ciated with expected future gains following the immediate action (δEV (h(π,),a)).
The critical proﬁt levels extracted for a particular example of σ = 2.50, and
γ = 0.90 is shown in Figures 1-3. Figure 1 compares the critical proﬁts levels to
alternative levels of discriminating ability in a fallible evaluator, Figure 2 shows the
eﬀect of placing a fallible evaluator in a hierarchy, and Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of
evaluation in a ﬂat polyarchical structure. Figure 4 then shows the results obtained
for this particular example, with σ = 2.50, and γ = 0.90. The results for a full
range of parameter values are reported in Figures 5a and 5b. The conﬁguration
space included a full range of parameter values: α = 0.01,0.05,0.10,0.50, σ =
0.50,1.00,...,4.50, and γ = 0.30,90 (additional simulations for γ = 0.10,0.50 were
conducted to assess robustness). We set entry costs, KEntry, to 10 and shutdown
costs, KExit, to 5 as in Miranda & Fackler (2002). A random draw determines the
initial operating status, o, of the business unit.
A business unit optimally operates during the next period if the short run proﬁt
for that period is above some level, πH, and a business unit optimally shuts down
if the proﬁt is lower than πL. Given entry and exit costs, πL < πH, and often, πL is
below zero. Once the TNC has accepted that one of its units enters a new market,
it is often optimal to continue operating despite negative spells of operating proﬁts.
The estimation of optimal actions provides a useful baseline for assessment of
the performance of decision makers with much less information and computational
power than required to solve eq. 4. The performance of three types of decision makers
are examined. The ﬁrst type of decision maker is the optimizer who is capable of
6In solving for the Bellman equation, the expectation E is represented by weighted discrete
shocks with std. dev. σ.
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transition function, the optimizer solves the corresponding Bellman equation. The
second type of decision maker is the local searcher who enters if the short-run proﬁt
is at least zero and exits if short-run proﬁt is below zero (other cut-oﬀ points were
examined to assess robustness). The third type of decision maker is the imperfect
evaluator (we examine diﬀerent levels of capability in evaluation as shown in Figure
1).
The TNC uses a ﬂexible organizational form to evaluate market opportunities.
Prior to entry, the TNC uses the “sceptical” hierachical form that allows entry only
after validation at a number of successive levels. After entry, decisions are delegated;
the evaluation team shifts to an “optimistic” polyarchical mode where approval of
the market conditions by any one actor is suﬃcient to stay in the market. Only
if everybody in the evaluation team disapproves of the market conditions, will the
TNC exit.
Results. We compare performance of the three types of decision makers in a
“horse-race” over 1000 periods. On the basis of 1000 samples, we ﬁnd that optimizers
always outperform local searchers and single fallible evaluators.7 Generally, local
searchers who are perfect evaluators using a wrong decision rule (critical proﬁt level
of π = 0, both in the case of entry and exit) also outperform single fallible evaluators.
The single fallible evaluator does not perform well because it tends to promote
frequent (costly) reversals of prior decisions. Since entry and exit, in each case, is
associated with a non-recoverable cost, too many costly mistakes get made.
The disadvantage of the local searcher and the single fallible evaluator is further
accentuated in a turbulent environment. With higher turbulence, the optimal entry
level of short-run proﬁt increases and the optimal exit level of short-run proﬁt de-
creases; the range between the values of short run proﬁt that are optimal for entry
and exit widens (holding entry and exit costs constant). With the local searcher,
the critical entry and exit values thus move further away from zero, which translates
into a performance loss. The case of evaluators with high ability (e.g. α = 0.50 in
Figure 1) is similar to the case of the local searcher; the critical entry and exit values
move further away from the values that this decision maker applies. However, in the
case of the fallible evaluator with low ability (e.g. α = 0.10 or lower), the critical
entry and exit values span a wider range in which reversals of prior decisions can
occur (see Figure 1).
The performance of the local searcher shown in Figure 4 is markedly higher than
the performance of the single fallible decision maker. Note however that two fallible
decision makers placed in a ﬂexible evaluation team almost do as well as the indi-
vidual local searcher. As more decision makers are added to the team, the quality of
the decisions further improve until it comprises ten members. As further members
are added, however, there is a marginal decline in performance.
7 As described below in the text, all results reported here were conﬁrmed through comprehensive
additional tests.
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The critical values of short run proﬁt used in the simulation reported in Figure 4
are those shown in Figures 1-3. Considering Figure 2, the eﬀect of adding members
to the hierarchical evaluation team used to evaluate entry is to push a portion of the
the screening function to the south-east of the critical entry value. Adding members
implies that the screening function of the evaluation team begins to approximate
the optimal entry level. At some point, however, the screening function is pushed
too far to the east, beyond the optimal level. In Figure 2, this is clearly the case
with 100 members. As shown in Figure 3, the exit case is perfectly symmetrical
to the case of entry. By switching between the hierarchy when entry opportunities
are evaluated and the ﬂat, polyarchy when exit options are considered, a team of
fallible evaluators can approximate, at least to some degree, the two optimal values
of entry and exit.
Rather surprisingly, and consistent with the conjectures made in the literature
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Child & McGrath, 2001; Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Vol-
berda, 1996, 1998), it turns out that that ﬂexible evaluation structures can dramat-
ically improve the performance of the fallible evaluator. Remarkably, we show that
TNCs employing ﬂexible teams of fallible evaluators can obtain proﬁts at the level
of the optimizer. We ﬁnd that this result is obtained if the TNC uses a hierarchy
prior to entry and then switches to a ﬂat polyarchical structure after its business
unit has entered the international market. Unless the evaluators use too sharp cri-
teria (misguided high ability), the levels of performance obtained in ﬂexible teams
of evaluators can asymptote the optimal level (obtained by solution of the Bellman
equation).
– FIGURE 5a –
– FIGURE 5b –
Considering the results shown in Figures 5a and 5b, it is remarkable that a team
of fallible agents generally outperforms a single fallible evaluator. Moreover, the gain
in performance occurs for very moderate team sizes of about ﬁve members. Using
teams of ﬁve in the way described here, rather than relying on single evaluators, will
generally lead to improved decisions. When evaluators are highly fallible in assessing
market conditions (e.g. because of poorly educated employees or fundamentally
uncertain market conditions), Panel 1 in Figures 5a and 5b shows that the number
of team members becomes very critical. By contrast, when evaluators have high
ability (low fallibility) in assessing market conditions, using a team of evaluators does
not help much (Panel 4). This result is reproduced also in additional simulations
(γ = 0.10,0.50) that were conducted to assess robustness.
Comparing teams of fallible evaluators with the results from two optimal values
13of entry and exit, we found very modest diﬀerences in performance for low to medium
levels of ability (α = 0.05,0.10). Only if ability was very high (α = 0.50) or very
low (α = 0.01), did the optimal evaluator have great advantage. The local searcher,
by contrast, was always at a great disadvantage because a single critical level was
used to determine both entry and exit.
Additional tests for robustness were conducted. They included local searchers
using either the positive or the negative optimal value of entry and exit. Also in this
case, the local searcher remains at a disadvantage under signiﬁcant entry and exit
costs. Because of signiﬁcant entry and exit costs, two critical levels must be used
(one for entry and a diﬀerent for exit). The local searcher is only capable of using
a single identical point, but two points must be used to approach optimal levels of
performance. We have identiﬁed two strategies that can be used to accomplish this.
The ﬁrst is the unrealistic addition of computational power that characterize the
optimizer. The second, by contrast, is the use of ﬂexible evaluation teams to help
fallible agents accomplish what any single imperfect agent is incapable of. Notably,
this conclusion only holds when agents are not entirely rigid in their evaluation of
alternatives. As previously mentioned, the perfect discrimination of local searchers
(Cyert & March, 1963; Lant & Mezias, 1990) is a rigidity that cannot be overcome
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2004; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2005). Flexible evaluation
teams can only help fallible discriminators (a measure of ﬂexibility at the individual
level).
4 Conclusion
The present article contributes by anchoring in a generic and commonly accepted
modeling structure the insights gained in numerous empirical studies. The results
obtained in the present study suggest that ﬂexible organizations can be designed to
respond to the twin pressures of exploitation and exploration. This is broadly in
accord with recent empirical ﬁndings that TNCs experiment with ﬂexible organi-
zational structures in response to increased levels of turbulence and uncertainty in
international markets.
A further issue concerns the level of entry and exit costs. Only if there are
signiﬁcant entry and exit costs, will there be an advantage in using ﬂexible orga-
nizational structures in evaluation. As entry and exit costs go to zero, the level of
short-term proﬁts at which both entry and exit is optimal approaches zero. In that
case myopic, local searchers that are capable of perfect discrimination of market
opportunities would do as well as the optimizer, and both of these types of agents
would outperform fallible evaluators.
There is no reason to believe that a single agent would also be a perfect discrim-
inator, however. Therefore, fallible agents could beneﬁt from being organized in
teams even if entry and exit costs go to zero. The structures that would lead to the
14highest performance levels would be stable (rather than ﬂexible) teams that helped
increase the discriminatory power around zero. Thus, fallible evaluators could gain
from being located in stable organization structures when entry and exit costs are
low. In contrast, ﬂexible organization structures beneﬁt fallible evaluators when
there are high entry and exit costs – and the gain is the highest when the ability
to assess market opportunities is rather modest. The present results also lead us
to expect that it is the added uncertainty in assessing market opportunities rather
than increased turbulence, which accounts for a possible advantage of using ﬂexible
organizational structures in evaluation. These are examples of testable propositions
that can be drawn from the present study.
The implications for research are fairly straightforward. We need empirical re-
search that can examine the relation between evaluation structures (or voting rules)
and the quality of the decisions that get made. Recent studies of entry and exit de-
cisions in response to uncertainty in international markets (Delios & Henisz, 2003;
Kogut & Singh, 1988; Reuer, 2000) have found that TNCs are increasingly pursuing
an international expansion strategy in uncertain policy environments. This implies
that decisions concern environments in which market opportunities are notoriously
hard to evaluate. It would therefore be important to understand how evaluation
structures are used. Are decisions made by single evaluators or teams of evaluators
when TNCs make entry and exit decisions (and other critical decisions)? What are
their characteristics (size, ﬂexibility, ﬂows of decisions) and how do these characteris-
tics impact the quality of the decisions that get made? Implications for practitioners
can be drawn along similar lines. It is generally important to involve more evalu-
ators in critical decisions (such as entry and exit decisions in TNCs), however, the
way teams are best organized is contingent upon a number of factors (as outlined
in the above).
The many studies of TNCs and MNCs, including those on entry and exit deci-
sions, have given the role of evaluation structures scant attention. This is surprising
since many decisions are made in groups (such as boards, top management teams,
and ad hoc committees). An early experiment by Birnberg, Pondy & Davis (1970)
examined the eﬀect of voting rules in stable evaluation structures and found, in
accord with general predictions, that a simple majority rule outperformed unanim-
ity (equivalent to hierarchy) and veto (equivalent to polyarchy). However, we have
very little knowledge about the actual voting rules, and evaluation structures, used
in TNCs. More generally, the study of evaluation in (business) organizations is an
important but rather neglected topic (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2005).
There is much prior research on entry and exit decisions in TNCs and MNCs,
including prior studies on the evaluation of foreign opportunities (Cavusgil, Kiyak
& Yeniyurt 2004; Schooler, 1974). These have developed useful general frameworks
for the assessment of market attractiveness and risk, but we lack evidence on how
such market choices actually happen and in what way evaluation teams are used.
Thus, systematic research is needed to ﬁll this gap in our knowledge. The present
study aims to direct attention to the role of teams in TNCs evaluation of market
15opportunities. To help stimulate further research on this important topic, we have
developed a modeling structure from which testable propositions can be drawn.
More generally, we hope this helps stimulate the use of rigorous modeling in the
study of international business without loss of practical relevance. Further advances
along such a path can help both managers and researchers navigate on the basis of
a more secure footing.
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Figure 1: Levels of ability of fallible evaluator (α= 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.50), local search (α →∞) and 
critical profit levels for optimal entry and exit.  Critical profit levels shown for σ= 2.5, γ= 0.90, 
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Figure 2: Levels of ability of hierarchical evaluation teams with two or more fallible members 
(example illustrates teams with 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 100 fallible member and ability, α= 0.10).  
Critical profit levels shown for σ= 2.5, γ= 0.90, KExit=10, KEntry=5. 
  



































































Figure 3: Levels of ability of flat, polyarchical evaluation teams with two or more fallible members 
  (example illustrates teams with 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 100 fallible member and ability, α= 0.10).   








































Figure 4: Performance of the optimizer, the local searcher and a single fallible evaluator (α= 0.10), 
compared with the performance of flexible evaluation teams with two or more fallible members 
(example illustrates teams with 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 100 fallible member and ability, α= 0.10).  
Example for σ= 2.5, γ= 0.90, KExit=10, KEntry=5.  









































































































































Figure 5a: Performance of a single fallible evaluator (α= 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.50), compared with the 
performance of flexible evaluation teams with two or more fallible members.  Results obtained for 
γ= 0.90, σ= 0.5, 1.0, …4.5, and teams with 1, 2, …, 10, and 100 fallible members.  Based on 1000 
samples for each point in the configuration space.  

















































































































































Figure 5b: Performance of a single fallible evaluator (α= 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.50), compared with the 
performance of flexible evaluation teams with two or more fallible members.  Results obtained for 
γ= 0.30, σ= 0.5, 1.0, …4.5, and teams with 1, 2, …, 10, and 100 fallible members.  Based on 1000 
samples for each point in the configuration space.  
 
 